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Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking
Markets
HANS DEGRYSE and STEVEN ONGENA
ABSTRACT This paper reviews how long-term relationships between firms and banks
shape the structure and integration of banking markets worldwide. Bank relationships arise
to span informational asymmetries that are endemic in financial markets. Firm-bank
relationships not only entail specific benefits and costs for both the engaged firms and banks,
but also directly affect the structure of banking markets. In particular, the sunk cost of
screening and monitoring activities and the 'informational capital' collected by the
incumbent banks may act as a barrier to entry. The intensity of the existing firm-bank
relationships will determine the height of this barrier and shape the structure of
international banking markets. For example, in Scandinavia where firms maintain few
and strong relationships, foreign banks may only be able to enter successfully through
mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, Southern European firms maintain many
bank relationships. Therefore, banks may consider entering Southern European banking
markets through direct investment.
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1. Introduction
Information problems are pervasive in financial markets and market participants
attempt to bridge the informational divides in a variety of ways. For example, bank
loan officers seek to discern through on-site visits the quality of the projects of the
borrowing firms. Depositors may turn to a credit rating agency to assess the safety
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Figure 1. Bank relationships and market structure.
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of their uninsured bank deposits, and dealers may engage in costly research tracking
stocks for which they act as market makers. Influential theoretical work in the early
'80s employed asymmetric information arguments to elucidate important phenom-
ena in financial markets, such as credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss,1981), the
occurrence of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig,1983), and the emergence and
existence of financial intermediation (Diamond, 1984).
Ensuing theoretical work attempts to provide a comprehensive explanation for
the panoply of institutions, practices, and contracts observed in financial markets.
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In particular, one recent strand of the literature explains the emergence of long-term
relationships between firms and banks,
2 and infers the significance of these
relationships for the structure of credit markets.
3 This paper aims to provide a
review of this extensive body of theoretical and related empirical work on bank -
firm relationships and the structure of banking markets worldwide.
4 Such a
summary may be timely, as some of the insights of the current academic literature
have yet to seep into policy discussions concerning, for example, the impact of the
ongoing reshaping of international banking markets on corporations and product
markets.
Figure 1 provides a road map for the rest of the paper. The second section
contains a discussion of the benefits and costs of a bank relationship for the firm.
The third (and main) section focuses on the consequences of the emergence of long-
term bank relationships for the structure and integration of international banking
markets. In particular, section three discusses the interaction between the existence
of bank relationships and the number of banks in the market, de novo bank entry, the
availability of substitutes, and the exit from banking markets. A fourth section deals
with the relevance of the strength of bank relationships for the correspondence
between banking system health and macro-economic activity. The final section
concludes.
2. Bank Relationships: Benefits and Costs for the Firm
2.1. Emergence and Existence of Bank Relationships
A firm-bank relationship can be defined as the 'close and continued interaction'
between a firm and a bank that 'may provide a lender with sufficient information
about, and voice in, the firm's affairs'(Petersen and Rajan,1995). It is through the
temporal progression of a relationship that a bank can learn more than other
financiers about a firm's ability to meet future obligations, either through the
monitoring of debt covenants and payment history or through other services offered
to the firm by the bank. For example, the bank may piece together an accurate
picture of the firm by looking at past activities on the firm's checking account
(Nakamura, 1993; Vale, 1993; Mester, Nakamura and Renault, 2001). Alterna-
tively, the bank may obtain superior information, as it becomes the firm's
shareholder (for example, Gorton and Schmid, 2000). It is this informational
asymmetry between the 'inside' bank and other 'outside' banks, which gives the
inside bank a competitive edge and almost assures continued interaction between
the bank and its high-quality borrowers (Fischer, 1990; Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992;
vonThadden, 1998).
2.2 Benefits of a Bank Relationship for the Firm
Firms may benefit from the availability / flexibility, control, reputation, and
confidentiality embedded in a bank relationship. First, there is quite a large
empirical literature showing that a credit relationship increases access to capital,
possibly at a lower cost and/or with less collateral.
5 In addition to increased
availability, a credit relationship may foster ex-ante flexibility in writing loan contracts
and allow a firm to fulfill its more complex and non-standard credit needs
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1985; Boot andThakor, 1994; vonThadden, 1995). For a
firm experiencing difficulty meeting contracted loan payments, a bank can smooth404 H. Degryse and S. Ongena
interest rates and reschedule capital payments through for example overdraft
facilities and the possibility of renegotiation (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).
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But the bank may also either accommodate the firm with new lending or refuse
future lending, conditional on actions taken by the firm during and after the distress
period. Thus, banks may have the ability to exert control over the management of
firm assets, which may induce managers to take optimal decisions (Rajan, 1992). If
repeated lending from a reputable financial institution provides credible certifica-
tion and control of managers' actions, a credit relationship may also bolster the
firm's reputation. Immaculate standing may facilitate current and future funding
from both shareholders and alternative outside sources (Diamond, 1991),7 though
the continuation of the bank relationship may require subordination of other debt
to bank debt (Longhofer and Santos, 2000).
In a recession, firms may prefer to solve their expected financial problems
privately in a credit relationship, rather than damaging their reputation on the
financial markets. The confidentiality of a bank relationship may also further facilitate
screening and monitoring (Campbell, (1979), may prevent leakage of proprietary
information to product market competitors (Yosha, 1995; von Rheinbaben and
Ruckes, 1998), and may encourage investment in Research and Development
(Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995).
2.3. Hold-up Problem and its Limits
The ability for a bank to privately observe proprietary information and maintain a
close relationship with its customer can also impose costs on the customer. For
example, an incumbent bank has the ability to offer only above-cost loans to its best
customers and holdup customers from receiving competitive financing elsewhere.
The incumbent bank gains this monopoly power through its informational
advantage over competitors. A high-quality firm that tries to switch to a competing
uninformed bank gets pooled with low-quality firms and is offered an even worse,
breakeven interest rate (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; vonThadden, 1998). Firms
may also have to invest resources searching for competing bank offers (Greenbaum,
Kanatas and Venezia, 1989).
The extent to which any one bank can exploit an information monopoly is
unclear (Farinha and Santos, 2001; Ongena and Smith, 2001). The bank's
monopoly power may be contained by loan commitments (Houston and Venkatara-
man, 1994), by the ability of the firm to time projects (Egli, Ongena and Smith,
2001), or by the potential for moral hazard problems associated with asset
substitution resulting from the higher interest rates charged by the inside bank
(Schmeits, 1997). The incumbent bank's monopoly power will also be mitigated by
accurate public signals of the firm's ability to pay to other banks (Sharpe, 1990),
and in due time by the firm's reputation for proper repayment which will allow the
firm easier access to public markets (Diamond, 1991). The costs arising from
holdup problems may also be tempered by the bank's desire to acquire a reputation
for refraining from extracting monopoly holdup rents (Sharpe, 1990), or for
financing productive firms by making more efficient continuation decisions in
renegotiation (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). The bank's affiliation with a
business group may also limit its aspiration for rent extraction from other group
members.
8
One seemingly simpler solution to the holdup problem is for a firm to start more
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rents, or induce competition later during the relationship. However, such
competition can be a 'double-edged sword'. Any outside lender that competes with
an existing inside bank by offering a lower interest rate at an interim stage of
financing will suffer from a winner's curse problem (Rajan, 1992; von Thadden,
1998). The inside bank will offer a competitive bid for good firms while allowing bad
firms to take the outside lender's offer. When competition ensues between more
symmetrically informed banks, monopoly rents can be eliminated, but only at the
expense of reduced relationship benefits, such as bank control over firm investment
behaviour (Rajan, 1992) or availability of credit for the firm (Petersen and Rajan,
1995).
3. Bank Relationships and the Structure and Integration of International
Credit Markets
3.1. The Number of Banks in a Domestic Banking Market
3.1.1. Single Bank Benchmark When costly information asymmetries exist between
the investors and project insiders, in theory a single bank may arise as the optimal
mechanism for channeling loans from investors to firms (Diamond, 1984). Indeed,
investors delegate the responsibility to a bank for monitoring firm cash flows,
thereby avoiding both duplication of monitoring and free riding. A single bank then
most efficiently performs the monitoring and diversification, which results in
cheaper financing for the firm. Hence, the number of banks in a domestic market
may be quite limited. Therefore, it may even not be possible for the firm to find
other banks to establish alternative credit relationships.
3.1.2. Internal Costs and Multiple Banks On the other hand, multiple banks may
arise even in a world with asymmetric information if bank relationships decrease the
need for monitoring (Daltung, 1997). By receiving a flow of relationship benefits a
firm effectively becomes a 'bank stakeholder', and its partial 'ownership' of the bank
creates an informational gain. The bank can become somewhat complacent vis-a-vis
the relationship firm and does not need to monitor its credit risk as closely as for
new loans.
9 But 'common ownership' will also give rise to duplication of monitoring
effort, as firms will have to monitor each other directly or indirectly by observing the
performance of the bank itself. For example, firms can obtain information about the
health of the bank from specialized agencies.
1
0 Common 'ownership' then limits the
optimal size of the financial intermediary, and multiple banks may co-exist in a
domestic banking market.
Alternatively, Cerasi and Daltung (2000) focus on the benefits and costs of
project diversification for the bank. By diversifying the bank portfolio and financing
it with debt, the bank can commit to a higher level of monitoring. However, a
banker monitoring more projects may become 'overloaded' and for example make
more mistakes. Consequently, these overload costs also limit the optimal size of the
bank.
3.1.3. Coordination among Multiple Banks Another explanation for the existence of
multiple banks is that the inability to communicate information or coordinate
actions across banks can be beneficial in inducing optimal behaviour on behalf of
firm managers. Specifically, decentralized economies prevent commitment to sink406 H. Degryse and S. Ongena
financing into long-term projects, because dispersed banks with limited capital do
not communicate or coordinate bargaining with each other. The lack of coordina-
tion between bankers may lead firm managers to make more efficient accept-reject
decisions on long-term projects as they cannot count on possibly inefficient long-
term financing (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995).
Diversity of opinion per se may create additional possibilities for multiple banks
to co-exist. For example, bankers may sequentially but unknowingly 'disagree'
about the quality of firm projects.
1
1 Multiple banks then arise to provide funds for
projects where such disagreements are prevalent. Diversity of opinion among banks
may result not only from the use of different types of credit worthiness tests but may
also occur in case of similar but imperfect credit worthiness tests.
These imperfect tests act as filters, the precision of which can be strategically
determined by the incumbent banks. Additional independent testing may improve
the precision of the screening but is also costly. In this respect, banks may choose to
develop their own independent test or opt for common filters through shared
databases or uniform screening criteria (Shaffer, 1998). For instance, certain types
of bank loans require standardized credit scoring models, often with common
selection criteria. Common filters may mitigate the severity of the adverse selection
problem. A single bank will determine the type of test by trading-off the additional
cost of screening with the costs incurred by wrongly accepting bad and rejecting
good projects. Hence, depending on how the trade-off is structured, multiple banks
may co-exist in the domestic market.
3.2. Market Entry
3.2.1. Relationships as a Barrier to Entry Entry is possibly limited because of
existing relationships. With multiple banks operating in the domestic market, firms
could potentially start a relationship with more than one bank. But the number of
bank relationships may affect the banks' incentives to monitor (Carletti, 2000) and
it is not clear how competitively these multiple banks will behave. As active banks
collect private information about the relationship firms, their loan origination costs
decrease and their profitability increases. If the initial information collection is
costly, it is a fixed, sunk cost, which tends to preclude competition QafFee and
Stiglitz, 1990). But even in the absence of initial fixed costs, the informational
capital collected by the inside banks during the relationship may act as a barrier to
de novo entry (Eber, 1996). For example, Dell' Ariccia (2001) shows that the
presence of these informational asymmetries may result in an equilibrium market
structure with a finite number of banks. Moreover, bank relationships may generate
franchise value for established banks.
1
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Through multiple and independent screening the incumbent banks may spot
and engage most high-quality entrepreneurs, leaving an increasingly adverse pool.
In addition, relationship banks may have the ability to sequentially match any
favourable outside offer. Hence, de novo bank entry may only be possible by
targeting predominantly newly established firms. If this is the case, bank entrants
face the sunk cost of executing many credit worthiness tests to build a solid
customer base. Incumbent banks may further increase the hurdle by investing in
technological improvements of the precision of their own tests, further eroding the
quality of the pool of unfunded projects (Gehrig, 1998).
The level of entry deterrence caused by the existence of bank relationships may
depend on the structure and size of the relevant banking market, the breadth ofBank-Firm Relationships and International Markets 407
permissible banking activities, and the quality of the information collection and
processing technology. For example, Fischer (2000) reports that German manu-
facturing firms in more concentrated banking markets have to transfer more
project-specific information to their lending banks than similar firms located in less
concentrated markets.
3.2.2. Second European Banking Directive and US Riegle-Neal Act Recent deregula-
tion and technological innovation need not lead to more contestability in banking
markets, The Second European Banking Directive (and the Economic and
Monetary Union in Europe) and the 1994 US Riegle-Neal Act have created
geographically large banking markets. However, cross-border (country or state)
banking does not necessarily result in more contestability, as investments in test
technology and bank relationships imply strategically chosen levels of sunk costs
and informational capital. Indeed, the harshness of adverse selection will depend
upon the number of banks operating in the market and the relationship-specific
investments made by the incumbent banks (Dell' Ariccia, Friedman and Marquez,
1999; Shaffer, 1998). Omnipresent retail networks may actually be the tools of
choice to cement relationships and deter entry.
The recent extension in scope of permissible banking activities in the US may
similarly result in widened and more intense bank-firm relationships and less entry,
as the additional banking activities may provide incumbent banks with alternative
information and influence channels (Santos, 1998). Finally, technological innova-
tions and advances in information processing may increase the precision of
screening and improve management of relationships with larger and more complex
firms, further deterring entry into the corporate banking market.
3.2.3. Empirical Evidence There is empirical evidence that tight bank relationships
may indeed deter entry. For example, a study looking at entry and exit of Swedish
banks into local banking markets between 1831 and 1990 concludes that survival
rates of new bank entrants are negatively related to the degree to which customer
relationships with local banks already existed (Bergstrom, Engwall and Wallerstedt,
1994). A study by Shaffer (1998) also illustrates the difficulty of de novo entry. He
finds that newly chartered banks in the US experience substantially higher loan
charge-off rates during their third through ninth years than incumbent banks.
Similarly, already existing bank relationships may explain current difficulties
foreign banks have in penetrating local markets directly and may explain part of
their cost and profit inefficiencies once operating there (Berger, DeYoung, Genay
and Udell, 2000). In particular, foreign banks may face problems in markets in
which domestic banks have strong, i.e. intense and long-lasting, single ties to
domestic business (Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, 2000; Ongena and Smith,
2000b). This may be, for example, the case in Scandinavian banking markets
(Engwall, Marquardt, Pedersen andTschoegl, 2001) andTschoegl (2001).
At the same time already existing cross-border bank relationships between large
domestic firms and foreign money center banks (for example based in London or
New York) may explain the lack of interest of these foreign banks in entering the
domestic market and setting up local subsidiaries (Tschoegl, 2001). Yet, strong local
bank relationships may prompt domestic banks to follow their important customers
overseas (Kindleberger, 1983), though empirical evidence on 'banks following their
customers'is somewhat mixed.408 H. Degryse and S. Ongena
Boldt-Christmas, Jacobsen and Tschoegl (2001), for example, find that
Norwegian banks went abroad not to lose their main corporate clients to foreign
competition. But domestic regulation limited their international expansion in scope
and place, and may also have fostered their cooperation in bank alliances abroad
(Jacobsen and Tschoegl, 1999). Seth, Nolle and Mohanty (1998), on the other
hand, find that during the 80s Japanese, Canadian, Dutch, and British banks in the
US allocated a majority of their loans to non-home country borrowers. Hence, they
conclude that the 'follow the customer' hypothesis may have a limited applicability.
In addition, Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith (2001) find that the foreign affiliates of
multinational corporations (they study 2118 affiliates operating in 20 European
nations) choose host nation banks much more often than home nation banks.
While bank relationships hamper de novo entry, part of the franchise value may
still flow to the borrowing firms, through for example increased credit availability
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995). The reason for this sharing is that the informational
sunk costs the banks have incurred, may provide the borrowing firms with some
strategic leverage (Scheffman and Spiller, 1992). It is also interesting to note that
while bank relationships may make mergers a preferable form of market entry, a
substantial literature discusses how mergers may negatively affect the provision of
relationship type lending to small businesses.
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To conclude, studying bank behaviour and market structure requires taking a
closer look at existing bank-firm relationships. Table 1 summarizes the importance
of various characteristics of the domestic banking industry, the informational
environment, and alternative sources of credit (further discussed in the next
sections) for the intensity of the domestic bank-firm relationships and the
development of cross-border bank activity. Depending on the strength of existing
relationships and the average quality of firms seeking a new bank, foreign banks may
prefer to service clients from abroad, may decide to enter de novo, or may engage in
a cross-border merger with or acquisition of a domestic bank (M&A). While a
foreign bank may enter a market characterized by weak and multiple relationships
directly, predominance of strong and bilateral relationships may leave only M&A as
a viable option.
3.3. Substitutes and Complements to Domestic Bank Relationships
While credit relationships may deter entry, established banks may have an incentive
for spontaneous information sharing via credit bureaus or to lobby for regulatory
imposed public credit registers (Padilla and Pagano, 1997; Jappelli and Pagano, 1999).
In this way, the inside banks can actually increase the borrowers' effort level, trading
off gains in their current profits with the lower more competitive interest rates in the
future. Banks can decide on the degree of information sharing (involving the use of
common filters). For example, we observe both black credit registers (that gather
information concerning behaviour of bad borrowers) and white credit registers
(through which banks share information about the total indebtedness of firms) (Pa-
gano and Japelli' 1993; Van Cayseele, Bouckaert and Degryse, 1994). When
asymmetric information is low, full voluntary information sharing may occur and
foster competition. However, when asymmetric information is moderate, banks may
actually hinder entry by strategically displaying only part of their inside information
(Bouckaert and Degryse, 2001).
In addition to information sharing among banks, the availability of substitutes to
domestic bank relationships will also influence the pricing and other conditions ofBank-Firm Relationships and International Markets 409
Table 1. Expected cross-border activities of foreign banks in a domestic market
A foreign bank will
service its clients enter by direct enter by merger
from abroad investment or acquisition
if bank-firm relationships are





















































" Omnipresent retail networks may not only act as a barrier to entry but may also strengthen bank-firm
relationships, deterring de now entry or cross-border service provision.
bA wide scope of permissible banking activities may provide incumbent banks with alternative
information and influence channels and result in more intense bank-firm relationships, deterring de novo
entry or cross-border service provision.
cMore advanced information processing may increase the precision of screening and worsen the quality
of pool of firms available to de novo entrants or cross-border service providers. It may also improve
management of relationships with larger and more complex firms, deterring de novo entry or cross-border
service provision.
d Independent screening worsens the quality of the pool of firms available to de novo entrants and cross-
border service providers.
'Bilateral relationships are often more intense than multiple relationships (for example, because of free-
rider problems), deterring de novo entry or cross-border service provision.
fThe sunk cost of the 'informational capital" collected by the incumbent banks may act as a barrier to de
novo entry and foreign service provision.
g Foreign banks servicing firms from abroad cannot access the information in the credit register and may
suffer adverse selection problems. Direct investment in the domestic market may provide immediate or
delayed access to the credit register. A merger or an acquisition provides access and an informational
level playing field versus the domestic competing banks.
h Many, large corporate customers operating abroad may warrant setting up a foreign bank subsidiary, in
order not to loose these relationship clients to other banks competing in the domestic market. A few,
smaller customers can be serviced from the home location.
1 If bank credit complements trade credit, in the sense that a firm will be granted trade credit before bank
credit, a developed system of trade credit will facilitate de novo entry.
'If public and bank credit are substitutes for high-quality firms, developed public debt markets allow de
novo entrants or cross-border service providers to identify high-quality customers more easily and
provide transactional banking services.410 H. Degryse and S. Ongena
domestic bank loans embedded in relationships. Cross-border bank relationships,
trade credit, and public debt constitute possible substitutes. Firms may go abroad
and seek to establish a cross-border bank relationship. However large informational
asymmetries between foreign banks and domestic firms may undermine such an
attempt, making cross-border bank relationships an inferior substitute for domestic
bank relationships. Buch (2001), for example, reports that physical distance (mainly
reflecting information costs) continues to hamper cross-border bank lending in
Europe, while Blandon (2001) finds that cultural differences in Europe may limit
foreign bank entry.
Sellers of primary or intermediary products also establish 'relationships' with
buying firms. Sellers grant credit, they can observe past payment behaviour, and
they often have an intimate knowledge about the firm's production processes and
industry. Therefor a trade credit relationship could substitute for a bank relationship.
However, this does not seem to be the case. Trade credit is usually more expensive
than bank credit. In addition, bank credit may actually be a complement to trade
credit, in the sense that a firm often has to be granted trade credit first before bank
credit can be obtained (Biais and Gollier, 1997). In effect, the bank is then tapping
indirectly into the inside information the supplier has collected during its
relationship with the firm.
Firms with an established reputation of profitability and timely debt repayment
may also seek direct financing on the public debt market. A solid relationship with a
high-quality bank may enable the firm to build a good reputation (Diamond, 1991).
However, to limit the financial mobility of the firm, the relationship bank may actually
seek to stunt the firm's development. Weinstein andYafeh (1998), for example, find
that Japanese firms depending on a bilateral bank relationship are less profitable and
grow slower than other firms do. On the other hand, Degryse and Ongena (2001)
report a robust negative correspondence between the number of bank relationships
and profitability for a 15-year sample of most publicly listed Norwegian firms.
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However, Norwegian firms place four times the amount of new equity (relative to the
existing stock) Japanese firms issue (Ongena, Smith and Michalsen, 2003). Hence,
banks seem less successful in their efforts to stunt the profitability of their client firms
in Norway, where public markets are more easily accessible.
3.4. Market Exit
On the one hand, if bank relationships create franchise value for the bank, banks
may be safer and less likely to exit or to default (Keeley, 1990). On the other hand,
if bank exit or default occurs, it may be more disruptive for the borrowing firms.
Local small or young firms or firms with asset-specific investments would suffer
most. It will be expensive for another bank to lend to one of the failed bank's
customers, because the bank has to invest all over again in the collection of
information (Stiglitz, 1992). And if the information-processing capacity of the
banking system is limited, bank failures and the sudden increase in the number of
firms seeking credit may cause congestion problems, potentially leading to market
failure (Gale, 1993).
Besides bank liquidation, regulatory formal actions,
1
5 dispositions of failed or
failing banks, and voluntary bank mergers will also cause temporary disruptions in
banking services, which may decrease the value of the bank relationship for the
borrowing firm.
1
6 And, as indicated earlier, even after a bank merger is
consummated, small firm lending by the new and larger bank may be reduced.Bank-Firm Relationships and International Markets 411
4. Bank Relationships and Macro-Economic Activity
4.1. Bank Lending Channel
Changes in monetary policy may affect real activity through a so-called 'bank
lending channel'.
1
7 This channel of monetary policy exists if a firm's bank debt and
other types of financing are imperfect substitutes. The strength and importance of
the bank relationship may determine the degree of substitutability. For example,
contractionary monetary policy may drive banks to curtail lending to all firms.
Especially small banks may experience problems attracting the additional deposits
necessary to offset the monetary policy shock (Kashyap and Stein, 2000).
While larger firms may have the possibility to shift to the public debt markets to
satisfy their ongoing credit needs (for example, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993),
especially small firms may face difficulties in finding substitutes for the dried-up
bank credit (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).These firms will be forced to cut back on
operations and planned investments, unless their main bank relationship provides
them with implicit insurance for exactly this type of scenario. It seems, therefore,
possible that, for example, the impact of a single European monetary policy differs
across regions depending on the strength of ongoing relationships between banks
and firms.
4.2. Banking Crises
Banking crises may destroy the stock and flow of relationship benefits accruing to
many firms, and hence may affect macro-economic activity.
1
8 Bank failures and
panics during the Great Depression years evidently exacerbated the contraction of
real activity in the US and other countries (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke and James,
1991). And bank failures during the US National Banking period from 1865 to
1914 may have reduced substantially, though possibly short-lived, aggregate output
(Grossman, 1993).
Studies of more recent banking crises attempt to isolate more clearly the role
and value of banking relationships. For example, Kang and Stulz (2000)
document that Japanese firms maintaining close bank relationships with distressed
domestic banks performed poorly in the early '90s. And, in a seminal study,
Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) document that client borrowing firms of
Continental Illinois in 1984 faced an average abnormal return of-4.2% on their
stocks 1984 around the impending bank insolvency date. Bae, Kang and lim
(2002), Chiou (1999), Djankov, Jindra and Klapper (2000), and Yamori and
Murakami (1999) confirm this result for Korean, Japanese, and East-Asian bank
defaults during the 1990s.
However identifying bank distress announcements that are independent of the
firms' expected profitability remains treacherous. In addition, it is not clear from
these studies which firms were affected most and whether all firms will be similarly
affected. Ongena, Smith and Michalsen (2001), for example, study the near-
collapse of the Norwegian banking system during the period 1988-91. They find
that although banks experienced large and permanent downward revisions in their
equity value during the event period, firms maintaining relationships with these
banks faced only small and temporary changes, on average, in stock price. They
hypothesize that because banks in Norway are precluded from maintaining
significant ownership control over loan customers, Norwegian firms were freer to
choose financing from sources other than their distressed banks.412 H. Degryse and S. Ongena
5. Conclusion
Banks and bank relationships may arise to mend pervasive asymmetric information
problems in credit markets. Close bank relationships generate both benefits and
costs for firms. Benefits are related to improvements in monitoring and relationship
specific investments. Costs concern the potential holdup problems arising over the
course of the relationship.
The emergence and existence of bank-firm relationships complicate any
assessment of the degree of contestability of domestic credit markets. Competition,
exit and entry, and the availability of substitutes are fundamentally affected by these
long-term bank relationships. De novo bank entry may be almost impossible if strong
bilateral relationships exist between incumbent banks and firms.
Established bank-firm relationships clearly are important in the current
development of the financial system across the world. The Second European
Banking Directive and 1994 US Riegle-Neal Act may well increase the scope of both
firms and banks in developing these relationships. However, our review stresses that
market imperfections may hamper the development of new bank-firm relationships
and de novo entry of banks. Hence, bank mergers and acquisitions may become the
preferred way of market entry in markets characterized by bilateral bank-firm
relationships and reduced small business lending in such markets may arise as an
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bank-firm relationship literature. Berlin (1996), Bornheim and Herbeck (1998), and Rivaud-Danset
(1996) provide interesting introductions to this literature. Neuberger (1998) reviews the literature
on the industrial organization of banking, while Scholtens (1992) reviews the theory of international
financial intermediation.
5. See for example, Agarwal and Elston (2001), Berger and Udell (1995), Blackwell and Winters
(1997), Cole (1998), D' Auria, Foglia and Reedtz (1999), Harhoff and Korting (1998), Elsas and
Krahnen (1998), and Lehmann and Neuberger (2001).
6. Berlin and Mester (1998) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) provide empirical evidence along these
lines.
7. Without reputation such external funding may be more expensive (Myers and Majluf (1984)).
8. For example, Khanna (2000).
9. For example, Arshadi and Lawrence (1991).
10. For example, Altman (1985).
11. In Alien (1993) stock market participants 'agree to disagree'.
12. For example, Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996).
13. For example, Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998). For reviews see Berger and Udell (1998)
and Samolyk (1997).
14. See also, for example, Foglia, Laviola and Marullo Reedtz (1998) and Fok, Chang and Lee
(2001).
15. For example, Peek and Rosengren (1995).
16. For example, Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2000).
17. Kashyap and Stein (1994) review this part of the literature.
18. Ongena (1999) reviews the literature linking bank default and real activity.Bank-Firm Relationships and International Markets 413
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